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And worse I may be yet: The worst is not 
So long as we can say ‘This is the worst.’ 
- King Lear (4.1.27-28) 
 
In a 1929 letter to Einstein, Freud explained a certain resistance or hostility 
towards psychoanalysis in these terms: ‘From the inside, we want only to be 
left in peace.  So if someone tries to turn our awareness inward, […] then our 
whole organization resists - just as, for example, the oesophagus and the 
urethra resist any attempt to reverse their normal direction of passage’ 
(quoted in Grubrich-Simitis 1995, 117).  A disposition of the human towards 
the outside world maps onto the ‘normal direction of passage’ in gut systems; 
a turn towards the unconscious, however - the entirety of an apparatus 
implied in that ‘awareness inward’ - is resisted in full by a physical 
organization hell-bent on a proper teleology of digestion.  It is fitting that 
Freud turns to the figure of esophageal revolt to defend the inward turn of 
psychoanalytic reflection - both historically, as vomit was of great 
importance in his and Breuer’s early work on the symptoms of hysteria, and 
evocatively, as analytic practice was accused of encouraging a vomitous 
production of questionably relevant speech with the famous injunction that 
the patient must tell all.  Vomit, as a privileged confession of the materiality 
of the body becomes, in Freud’s comparison, a privileged confession of the 
non-materiality of the body in that inward turn.  (Freud’s metaphor also 
strikingly suggests that it is the work of the analyst to finger the patient’s 
throat in a forced bulimia.)  At the same time, however, the gesture that 
Freud invokes and affiliates with analytic praxis is an inward turn lacking 
interiority: an orientation towards the unconscious as the site of alterity in 
the subject.  Vomit’s gagging richness relies on precisely this conceptual 
flexibility: the expulsion of the contents of the stomach through the mouth 
links gut and face, bowl and rim, deep bodily space with orifices that open to 
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the outside, and it therefore hovers between structures of interiority as they 
are riddled through by unknowable, unspeakable, unfathomable exteriorities.  
Vomit tempts; it solicits.  If the first lure of vomit is this drive to 
construct it as a metaphor for any of those inward processes or exterior 
productions (to read, in other words, wet liquid rushes as anything other 
than vomit), the second is a rabid desire to link it to cause, to fix and 
determine why precisely one’s lower esophageal sphincter has relaxed and 
abdominal musculature has contracted - Because you are dying or because 
you are in pain.  Because you are pregnant; because you are a child (down 
my father’s back).  My argument in this essay will be that vomit must neither 
be treated as a metaphor that rushes past its foul materiality nor reduced to 
narratives of provocation that bind it to the always-comforting logic of 
ordered causality.  Rather, two films by David Lynch suggest how vomit in 
film can function as a structure that puts formal material into play and, 
further, that produces a relationship between ethics, violence, and lingering 
smell.  Vomit is risky stuff: the danger for criticism is that we flow too fast 
past its formal operators, what it specifically does to a visual text. 
That vomit puts in play formal questions - and that the gut and 
alimentary canal might be subsumed to formal elements - is suggested in 
work dating back to the beginning of Lynch’s career.  His 1967 mixed-media 
piece of screen and sculpture sometimes titled Six Figures Getting Sick or Six 
Men Getting Sick (a symptomatic confusion) is indebted to Francis Bacon’s 
onto-aesthetic project of rending figuration and representation to realign 
Figures with rhythm, color and what Deleuze calls the ‘violence of sensation’ 
([1981] 2002).  This early piece is comprised of open-mouthed faces in 
ambiguous states of frozen expulsion - at once, vomit and the scream or wail.  
The piece, often figured as Lynch’s Ur-text (if not this, then the 1977 
Eraserhead), consists of a screen sculpted into dimension; in a taking-literally 
of Deleuze’s notion of Baconian ‘forces that model flesh or shake it,’ the 
figures in relief were modeled on Lynch’s own body as an indexical cast 
([1981] 2002, xxix).  On the left side of the work are three sculpted heads: 
the most classical bust looks down, head tilted and resting in hand; the 
middle one parts its mouth as though in the beginnings of speech or a 
nascent Laocoön; and the final figure is an open-mouthed scream of a being: 
Edvard Munch on the Odessa Steps.  A bifurcated half of another figure is 
painted as a flat image on the right side of the screen, while projected and 
increasingly abstracted head-things fill out the grouping over the course of 
the one-minute loop, set all the while to the piercing wails of a siren’s sonic 
catastrophe. 
Moving from left to right in the film version of the installation, as 
though laying out a text in print, and following the cine-archelogy of the 
head leader’s descent, the three sculpted heads first appear, followed by three 
Film-Philosophy 15.2 2011 
 
Film-Philosophy | ISSN: 1466-4615   
 
53 
projected sketches of figures.  Under the numerical countdown the word 
‘Look’ flashes, the imperative displacing deixis from the wagging digital to 
the directed ocular.  Though less forcibly deformed than those one finds in 
Bacon’s paintings, the heads are primarily fleshy arcs with hollowed-out 
holes above squared supportive ledges of bone and weight.  Two of the 
projected heads on the right bleed into each other through the mediation of a 
gut-like pouch with tubes and hollows, a schematic for a duodenal ethics of 
intersubjectivity through digestive flow.  Each figure is eventually elongated 
by a slender tube leading to a paunchy round; in its curved frame appears a 
graphic spiral, sign of affective turbulence.  The graphic and the gastric 
continually swap places in a perversion of the famous Godardian law of 
representation: It’s not chyme; it’s red.  The piece is organized around the 
formal labors of the enteric nervous system: esophageal flinches and 
undulations of the viscera provide the work’s halting yet churning rhythms, 
and the visual language derives from lengths of alimentary 
interconnectedness, bowls and bowels, intestinal fluidity, and abdominal 
rebellion.  Peristaltic undulations effect both the animation of the body and 
the animation of the sculpted screen.1  The inhalations of many swallowings 
and the exhalations of many heavings culminate in a gastric eschatology in 
which the six figures vomit copious lines of dripping paint.  The gagging 
pour floods white streaks against a now violet background, the overflow 
composed of the sum of all colors of light and simultaneously a perceived 
absence of color, corporeal interiority’s red taken to its final logic of flat 
visual annihilation, a new kind of blankness. 
If the white rush is the cannibalism of all colors, a totality of 
representational tonality, then its structural parallel is the additive excess of 
media cannibalized in the piece, exemplified by the ontological paradox of a 
‘sculpted screen,’ but also signaled in the leader and horizontal lines of dots 
evoking celluloidal sprockets; the photographic x-ray of a torso; the chaotic 
intermix of painting, relief, image, sound; stasis, movement, space, surface.  
This Gesamtkunstwerk binges on representational intake, and its additive 
totality regurgitates that glut.  The piece’s spasmodic form is sick - a sick 
structure, not content; sick in and as its durational gesture.  Emesis is not a 
subject of the work, not an iconographic thisness to be located or critically 
pointed to, but the animating motion of the turbulent form.  Nevertheless, 
readings have persisted in figuring the emetic as a thematic, positing that the 
project initiated ‘Lynch’s interest in vomiting, which will be graphically and 
frequently represented in his paintings as well as in his full-length films’ 
(Kaleta 1993, 7); in another version of this claim: ‘sickness (or disease) and 
                                                
1 Equally, chyme’s mix of the liquid and solid, the constitutively partially-digested, is 
a meta-structure for the mix of media and the confusion of stasis and movement 
(and animation and sculpture) in the piece. 
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fire are two themes to which Lynch would return continually’ (Hughes 2001, 
6).  Martha Nochimson takes this critical urge to its logical conclusion, 
figuring vomiting in the one-minute loop as a narrative act that takes place, 
and as a super-metaphor operative in Lynch’s corpus as a whole.2  
On the question of what takes place in the piece, there is disconcerting 
critical agreement on some version of the following account: ‘Bright red 
stomachs dropped down from the chins of the faces.  Eventually, all the 
stomachs appeared to explode into flames.  Then all six men seemed to vomit 
violently’ (Wilson 2007, 1).  Even when criticism falls short of putting the 
vomit to work for narrative, as in Nochimson, there is a narrative arc 
imputed to the temporal ordering and culminating crisis of the piece: There 
are men; vomiting is something they do.  However, a Figure is not a body.  
Writing the vomit or the vomiting into the piece as a narrative occurrence or 
thematic trope involves critics in the ignominious task of fleshing out the 
Figures, imputing to them a corporeal density, adding in exits and entries 
that must be prodded and poked to ascertain their material certainty.  
Sanitized in the literature is the messier violence of the spill of paint, the 
excavation of formal material from the materiality of the form.  For the 
vomitus of a Figure is always and only paint.  The six Figures are sick on 
form.  Or, rather, there is no such ‘are sick’ - they are getting sick, in-process 
and in movement, animated as sick and animatedly sick.  Animation as a 
technical gesture produces a formal nausea, whose roots in naus (ship) 
suggest the sickness of and from movement, here a sickness on and through 
the movements of mediated technological representation.  In other words, 
and with more ferocity than the clenchings of any intestine: in Lynch’s work, 
the Figures do not vomit; the vomit Figures.   
                                                
2 For Nochimson, Lynch’s ‘love of narrative’ is first evident in Six Figures: ‘[H]e 
makes the process of vomiting a Lynchian paradigm of the narrative structure.  
Vomiting is a brilliant image of the unstoppable narrative compulsion, proceeding 
relentlessly from the beginning, through the middle, to an end.  At the same time, it 
is a completely involuntary process’  (Nochimson 1997, 149-150). In a telling error, 
Nochimson describes the piece as depicting only five men, postulating that perhaps 
‘the “sixth man” is the spectator, and the title is a humorous comment on viewer 
engagement and identification’ (Nochimson 1997, 150).  Of course, this is incorrect: 
there are six Figures per the title in the piece and the spectator does not figure as an 
additive supplement to the count.  On the one hand, Lynch’s early work was 
unavailable for a long time, and many critical accounts relied on second- or third-
hand reports of the 1967 installation, so Nochimson’s mistake is neither surprising 
nor problematic within this context.  On the other hand, the mistake reveals a 
broader critical bias, for Nochimson’s insistence on reading Lynch’s work as 
structured by an obsession with linear narrative compels her to place within Six 
Figures a corporeal subject in the figure of an engaged spectator.  This slip attempts 
to turn the Figures into men, to reintroduce not only a body, but a subject to the 
labors of the formal freneticism.   
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And it figures (and Figures) as a formal exteriority.  Despite calls to 
return both vomit and Figure to a language of narrative, interiority, 
subjectivity, and recuperable meaning, the choking halting turbulence of Six 
Figures Getting Sick involves the wrenching failure of an impossible 
separation from the substrate of painterly material.  It is important that this 
exteriorization of form figures through vomit, for esophageal passage - 
despite often being invoked as the trope par excellence of interiority expelled 
- as in the letter by Freud with which I began - is in fact a running-through of 
the inside by the outside.  Like Foucault’s description of the madman’s 
privileged enclosure of the outside, ‘kept at the point of passage’ in his sea 
voyage, ‘put in the interior of the exterior,’ vomit is an experience of the 
force of the outside from within the body excerpted around esophageal 
tubing ([1961] 1965, 11).  In Six Figures Getting Sick, against the telos of 
proper digestion, ending in defecation and a voiding of material through the 
coursing hollow at the center of the body, the face returns as the site of entry 
and exit - the mouth the only anus within the schematic - circling back intake 
in a citational recall as though performing the collapse of what Jean-Luc 
Nancy calls ‘all the body’s introductory topoi’ - including ‘breaching bodies, 
accesses, excesses, orifices, pores and portals of all skins, scars, navels, 
blazon, pieces, and fields, body by body, place by place, entry by entry by 
exit’ - into one singular site of swallowing/spewing activity (Nancy [2006] 
2008, 55).  Despite the nod towards a humanism organized around faciality 
as the site of subjectivity, the body is ultimately parsed, pieced and dissected 
in this work, the human form reduced to tubal span.  This length is not an 
interior enclosed within the confines of the subject, but a running through of 
the outside that supplants the self, a hollowing out at the core of the corpus.  
As Michael Gershon figures this excavation: 
 
The space enclosed within the wall of the bowel, its lumen, is part of 
the outside world.  The open tube that begins at the mouth ends at the 
anus.  Paradoxical as it may seem, the gut is a tunnel that permits the 
exterior to run right through us.  Whatever is in the lumen of the gut is 
thus actually outside our bodies.  (1998, 84) 
 
Although vomit is retrofitted to a hermeneutics of interiority and depths (of 
substance or signification) in criticism that thematizes, metaphorizes or 
corporealizes its gesture in relation to an imaginary embodied figure with 
bowel and shape, vomiting should be regarded rather as bringing to the 
surface the exteriority of form that does not represent the Figures but that is 
constituted by them.  Six Figures Getting Sick is, then, neither about men 
sickened, nor a presentation of vomit as a trope, theme, or narrative - it is the 
sickness of and on form.   
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If this heaving visual language constitutes one possibility for a formal 
(and neither spectatorial nor metaphorical) disgust, Lynch’s vomit of 1967 
retains one central problem: a stubborn link to the subject, a bind, that is, to 
vomiting.  My argument requires the strict separation of vomiting from 
vomit; in fact, the theoretical framework to which this article is indebted 
insists on the distinction.  In ‘Economimesis,’ his analysis of the role of 
disgust in Kant’s aesthetic philosophy, Derrida writes:  
 
It is indeed vomit that interests us rather than the act or process of 
vomiting, which are less disgusting than vomit in so far as they imply 
an activity, some initiative whereby the subject can at least sill mimic 
mastery or dream it in auto-affection, believing that he makes himself 
vomit.  (Derrida [1975] 1981, 21) 
 
It is vomit itself in its material being-there that figures not as a sign of disgust 
but as the irreducible undigested aspect of disgust that interests both Derrida 
and me; any attempt to reduce vomit to vomiting, to attach it to a 
fantasmatically volitional subject, then, is to attempt a translation of radical 
expulsion into temporary exteriorization.  Similarly, Lynch’s triumph over 
attempts to put vomit to work as something other than vomit is to lose the 
subject altogether in his 1990 Wild at Heart.  Instead of Figures getting sick, 
sick, in the later film, is all there is. 
‘Economimesis’ figures vomit as central to transcendental aesthetics, 
continuing a long tradition in philosophy that privileges vomit for theorizing 
disgust, and privileges disgust for theorizing (as its negative) the field of 
aesthetics.  As though rising out of the sticky muck of the aesthetic’s 
pleasures itself, in the mid-eighteenth-century debates that ultimately 
constituted the separate field of philosophy called aesthetics, Ekel [disgust, 
loathing] is first linked to an overindulgence on the aesthetic, an excessive 
sweetness that past a certain point becomes nauseating.  The risk of overdose 
on the beautiful, a surfeit experience of pleasure, can thus lead to the 
sensation of unpleasure, a super-satiation and exhaustion of the senses in 
what ultimately refuses distance or contemplation - therefore, corresponding 
rules were developed for holding at bay the aesthetic (and gastronomic, and 
erotic) lure of gorging until one chokes.  The strongest formulation of 
disgust’s law of exclusion appears in Kant’s third Critique in a discussion of 
the mimetic and the beautiful: 
 
The furies, diseases, devastations of war [. . .] can, as harmful things, 
be very beautifully described, indeed even represented in painting; only 
one kind of ugliness cannot be represented in a way adequate to nature 
without destroying all aesthetic satisfaction, hence beauty in art, 
namely, that which arouses loathing [Ekel].  For since in this strange 
sensation, resting on sheer imagination, the object is represented as if it 
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were imposing the enjoyment which we are nevertheless forcibly 
resisting, the artistic representation of the object is no longer 
distinguished in our sensation itself from the nature of the object itself, 
and it then becomes impossible for the former to be taken as beautiful.  
(Kant [1790] 2000, 190) 
 
Ekel is the particular form of ugliness that functions as the limit for the 
possibilities of the aesthetic.  For Kant, as for much aesthetic theory of the 
time, disgust figures as an unintegratable aspect of the aesthetic that the 
aesthetic cannot speak.   
Or, digest - as goes Derrida’s formulation in ‘Economimesis.’  Here, 
Derrida’s deconstructive laser is focused on several terms in Kant’s logic, in 
particular the seeming opposition between pleasure and enjoyment, and the 
titular relation between mimesis and oikonomia, art and salary. It is to the 
role of disgust in Kant’s aesthetic, but also logocentric, philosophy that 
Derrida eventually turns - and ‘turn’ (strephein) is appropriate here, as 
disgust is framed as a catastrophe for the philosophy of the beautiful.  The 
mouth as a key but ambiguous term in Kantian philosophy becomes the 
central site for a struggle over the opposing terms in Derrida’s reading; as 
Derrida writes of Kant’s oral examples and metaphors, there is ‘a certain 
allergy in the mouth, between pure taste and actual tasting [dégustation]’ 
([1975] 1981, 16).  Disgust poses the problem of relating the two forms of 
taste (aesthetic) and taste (tasting) to each other, a relation that will be 
figured as an irreducible opposition.  As the question of orality comes to the 
fore, Derrida insists on the double sense in which mouth is taken (and given) 
in Kant: this mouth no longer ‘merely occupies one place among others.  It 
can no longer be situated in a typology of the body but seeks to organize the 
sites and to localize all the organs’ ([1975] 1981, 16).  Place of consumption 
(sensual: taste) and production (textual: logos), the mouth becomes a fold.  
Derrida finally distinguishes in Kant between ‘two means of entering and two 
means of leaving the mouth, where one would be expressive and emissive (of 
the poem in the best case), the other vomitive or emetic’ ([1975] 1981, 16). 
The ‘certain mouth’ of Kantian interiorization: 
 
[A]ssimilates everything to itself by idealizing it within interiority, 
masters everything by mourning its passing, refusing to touch it, to 
digest it naturally, but digests it ideally, [. . .] produces 
disinterestedness in the possibility of pronouncing judgments [. . .] 
governs a space of analogy into which it does not let itself be drawn. 
(Derrida [1975] 1981, 20) 
 
Ekel functions as the ‘border which traces its limit and the frame of its 
parergon,’ in other words, that which is ‘excluded from it and what, 
proceeding from this exclusion, gives it form, limit, and contour’ (Derrida 
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[1975] 1981, 21).  Disgust’s productive exclusion from fields of good taste 
defines and gives shape to the field of the aesthetic itself.  The prohibiting 
gesture that Derrida locates is not one that is reducible to any opposition to 
ingestion, for it is not a relation that is in play, but another figuration 
altogether of the negative, the excluded, the limit.  Kant’s logo-
phonocentrism excludes ‘what does not allow itself to be digested, or 
represented, or stated [. . .].  It is an irreducible heterogeneity which cannot 
be eaten either sensibly or ideally and which - this is the tautology - by never 
letting itself be swallowed must therefore cause itself to be vomited’ (Derrida 
[1975] 1981, 21).  The centrality of vomit to transcendental aesthetics is not 
due only to its ‘specific parergonal overflow’ for Derrida, then - that it neatly 
(if also wetly) figures for all that is excluded, rejected, emitted, expelled - he 
goes much further to call vomit a scheme that structures the very form of 
exclusion in Kantian thought.3   
Two things are seemingly undigestable for the transcendental aesthetic 
- the shattering, negative pleasures of the sublime and the figuration of the 
ugly in the Fine Arts.  But, in fact, neither stands outside Kant’s system.  
‘Although repulsive on one of its faces,’ Derrida writes, ‘the sublime is not 
the absolute other of the beautiful.  It still provokes a certain pleasure’ 
(Derrida [1975] 1981, 22).  The negativity of the sublime - and that of the 
ugly, evil, or horrible - is recuperable.  The non-recuperable excluded is a 
singular unassimilable thing, and it therefore forms ‘the transcendental of the 
transcendental, the non-transcendentalisable, the non-idealisable, and that is 
the disgusting’ (Derrida [1975] 1981, 22).  As the hole of absolute otherness 
in aesthetics, disgust poses a problem for Kant’s theory of representation; 
‘vomit is represented in advance as forcing pleasure, and that is why it 
disgusts’ (Derrida [1975] 1981, 22).  The disgusting or reviling is too much 
of the object that it purports to represent - recall Kant’s language: ‘the object 
is represented as if it were imposing the enjoyment which we are nevertheless 
forcibly resisting.’  In other words, disgust is the expression of an ugliness 
that fails to represent, that cannot therefore be reinscribed into an aesthetic 
or - in a different sense of its failure to represent - political economy; it is a 
representation that, in Derrida’s words, ‘annuls itself,’ that fails in relation to 
the representable, that ‘forces one to consume, but without allowing any 
chance for idealization’ (Derrida [1975] 1981, 22).  Disgust comes too close - 
it forces itself down your throat and yet cannot be digested, only expelled 
                                                
3 Derrida’s description of the ‘parergonal overflow’ of vomit extends his theorization 
in The Truth in Painting of Kant’s exploration of supplementary parerga.  There, 
Derrida argues that Kant’s parergon ‘inscribes something which comes as an extra, 
exterior to the proper field [. . .] but whose transcendent exteriority comes to play, 
abut onto, brush against, rub, press against the limit itself and intervene in the inside 
only to the extent that the inside is lacking.  It is lacking in something and it is 
lacking from itself’ (Derrida [1978] 1987, 56).  
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forever, utterly - hence Derrida’s memorable conclusion, ‘the disgusting can 
only be vomited’ (Derrida [1975] 1981, 23).  This is the particular perversion 
of disgust: it provides excessive enjoyment (à la jouissance) and thus, in turn, 
it eats the conditions for the possibility of pleasure - in a formulation horrible 
for Kant if acceptable to a Nietzsche or a Bataille, disgust ‘makes one desire 
to vomit’ (Derrida [1975] 1981, 23). 
In all this so far, we have remained with the mouth, the embouchure; 
in the French, degoût lets disgust rest lightly on lips, teeth, tip of the tongue - 
all that is involved in either hungrily taking in or appallingly refusing matters 
of goût.  However, Derrida concludes ‘Economimesis’ with a provocative 
assertion that the logocentric system can accommodate, consume, and 
represent everything except vomit, which, nevertheless, is not the negative of 
the system.  For what stands to the edge of the aesthetic is one single thing 
further, and in this move both Kant and Derrida lose the mouth, leave the 
tasting sense behind.  Citing Kant’s claim that the degraded senses smell and 
taste ‘are both more subjective than objective’ (Kant [1798] 2006, 49), and 
fail to lead to direct cognition without interventionary media (salts, liquid, 
air), Derrida notes that despite this similarity, smell suffers a harsher 
treatment from Kant than taste proper.  The eighteenth-century philosopher 
sniffs in his Anthropology:  
 
Smell is taste at a distance, so to speak, and others are forced to share 
the pleasure of it [mit zu geniessen], whether they want to or not.  And 
thus smell is contrary to freedom and less sociable than taste [. . .].  
[T]aking something in through smell (in the lungs) is even more 
intimate than taking something in through the absorptive vessels of 
mouth or throat.  (Kant [1798] 2006, 50) 
 
Smell not only defies reason and compromises autonomy: Kant calls it 
‘ungrateful,’ not worth cultivating.  Kant’s anxiety about and condemnation 
of the sense revolves around the unsociability of smell - which both fails to 
promote sociability, as does the superior taste with its meal-taking and 
whatnot, and also violates sociality by affirmatively imposing on the freedom 
of others.  From this, Derrida concludes with the extraordinary formulation: 
‘There is worse than the literally disgusting.  And if there is worse, it is 
because the literally disgusting is maintained, as security, in place of the 
worse’ (Derrida [1975] 1981, 23).  In other words, so long as disgust remains 
with the mouth, even its negativity is assimilable to logocentrism; past literal 
disgust (degoût) is that something more, that something even worse than the 
very worst of the strongest sensations. 
My argument follows from the way in which disgust is figured by 
Derrida, reading Kant, not as a compendium of its possible provocations 
(dirt, the corpse, feces) - each of which might suggest that a relation to its 
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object and cause would be possible - but as the form of the possibility for 
something more disgusting than the literally disgusting.  Because disgust falls 
outside of any economy, its debt cannot be secured: that which is ‘l’exclu 
absolu’ does not designate a limit, nor the reaching of a transgression, even 
less the intention or object of that negative affect, but rather, it designates the 
place without placement - a place that cannot take place.  This non-place is 
not an issue of taste (aesthetic or sensual), but an opening up of the 
possibility for ‘something more disgusting than the disgusting, than what 
disgusts taste.  The chemistry of smell exceeds the tautology taste/disgust’ 
(Derrida [1975] 1981, 25).  What is unnamable in logocentrism (what 
cannot pass through the mouth) and ‘which in turn can only vomit it and 
vomit itself in it’ is that which is completely unassimilable to speech; as 
Derrida says, the word ‘vomit arrests the vicariousness of disgust; it puts the 
thing in the mouth’ (Derrida [1975] 1981, 25), in turn halting the risk of 
disgust, which is the ever about-to-arrive unassimilable that cannot be 
spoken.  What disgust names, for Derrida, is the structure that overrides 
individual instantiations of the disgusting in the ‘something more disgusting 
than the disgusting,’ that which is ‘worse than the literally disgusting.’  It is 
in this formulation that I locate the possibility for a visual ethics that will be 
elaborated in relation to the second film by Lynch, Wild at Heart.  My 
argument is that the form of disgust is a designation of the something worse 
than the worst - a structure organized around the opening of exclusion and 
not a content that fills it in, or gives it shape, coherence or substance. 
This something-more is where Derrida ends his meditation on Kant’s 
Critique, but it is precisely with the twin figures of unsociable smell and the 
designation of the worse than the worst - ‘something more disgusting than 
the disgusting’ - that I want to take up this argument and produce its logic 
elsewhere.  This production will not be entirely faithful to Derrida’s reading; 
rather, it considers whether one can approach disgust through a prescriptive 
approach towards that final formulation, what I want to call ‘an ethics of the 
worse than the worst.’  This formulation produces its own regurgitation of 
Lacan’s order in his seventh Seminar, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, that one 
should not give ground relative to one’s desire.  This citational maxim might 
be designated as - Do not give ground relative to your disgust.  Do not give 
up on (the non-place designated by) your Ekel!  Thus, the bad object of my 
argument is a film like Lukas Moodysson’s A Hole in My Heart (Ett hål i 
mitt hjärta, 2004), in which, after all that can be done to bodies and all that 
can be done to disgust - the worms, the fucking, the violence, the gorging, the 
pissing - vomit appears as the climactic sign of having reached the limit, that 
transgression can go no further, that the film can end no other way than 
having Geko stick his finger down his throat, lean over inches from Tess’s 
face and vomit into her mouth for her to take it in, to swallow, to consume.  
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Such a film purports to cross the threshold, to transcend, to take a spectator 
to a limit case, to the realm of the excluded - and to do so via vomit 
explicitly; (many texts do this: consider the pornography produced by 
Extreme Associates).4  A relation to disgust that culminates with vomit 
imagines it consumes the non-place designated by the worse than the worst.  
In other words, by figuring vomit as the ultimate, as the pure event as such, 
Moodysson’s film purports to eat and become the ‘something more 
disgusting than the disgusting,’ instead of designating as uninhabitable the 
properly impossible position of the worse than the worst.  Vomit here is not 
the worst precisely because it says: This is the worst. 
Historically, film theory (in particular horror studies and work 
indebted to Kristeva’s theory of abjection) have concretized disgust into 
specific and singular things, images, or icons (that corpse; this rot; these 
maggots); however, doing so involves what Derrida describes as making a 
down payment on something before true disgust, paying out a security in 
place of disgust as such.  The ‘worse than the worst’ is a grammatical 
paradox, the suggestion that the superlative is surpassable a logical 
impossibility.  But the force from that continual generative opening into a 
space that language does not allow, that regurgitation without pause, 
involves the continual negotiation with exclusion and irrecuperable negation 
that is the animated structure of disgust.  Disgust is a beyond of any thing: 
the form of the possibility for the ever-worse.  The move to identify and give 
substance to the excluded is an attempt at moving the exterior of thought to 
the interior of theory (or a theory, of disgust).  To concretize the excluded - 
to point, stark deixis, and insist ‘this is this’ or ‘this is it’ - is to avoid having 
to think disgust by only ever thinking the disgusting. 
The history of disgust is the history of its spatial metaphors.  The 
mapping of disgust involves two distinctly different models: a three-
dimensional plot of relative positions in space in disgust’s affinity to notions 
of nearness or its threat of proximity (in the eighteenth-century aesthetician’s 
argument that it fails to leave adequate room for contemplative distance); 
and a series of points on a line, beyond which one must not pass, the model 
of disgust whereby it derives from excess.  These two spatial models cannot 
be mapped on the same set of axes, for the one involves a coming-too-close, 
while the other involves a going-too-far: figured onto a singular site, the pull-
me-push-you tension might rip a body apart.  The spatio-temporal paradoxes 
of disgust are fitting for a notion that is not substance but structure around 
                                                
4 Formally, this scene is treated as the film’s finale; consider the BFI review of the 
film (Gilbey 2005): ‘Geko vomits into Tess’ willing mouth.  Moodysson puts great 
skill into choreographing this degrading pantomime; he clearly regards it as the 
film’s dramatic climax, not to mention a distillation of the social ills he has 
diagnosed.’  
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which forces bend, contract, and mobilize, like a black hole singularity 
measurable only by the intensity of its displacements.  Theories that fix 
disgust in space and time lose not only the movements of disgust as a 
generative structure, but attempt to co-opt the certainty of positions in space 
at the expense of losing disgust’s speed, velocity, and nauseous rush.  Indeed, 
disgust’s emesis compels a reversal of metaphorical energies; less the black 
hole vacuum of meaning that its zero-point function as the excluded of 
philosophy might suggest, disgust is far more like the hypothetical white 
hole, an emissive, productive horizon, ejecting matter in place of absorbing 
it.  In place of a structure that can only suck things in, disgust continuously 
spits things out: you might say that disgust continually vomits that which it 
never consumed.  If the black hole pathos is that it is that from which 
nothing can escape, the white hole ethos is that it is that which is impossible 
to reach.  Because there is always a horizon beyond which the worse than the 
worst may be put into play, the worst is exceedable by the ever worse.  It is 
therefore never fully arrived, and, thus, certainly, and ineluctably - the worst 
is always yet to come. 
Given that I am treating disgust not as a container for specific objects 
but as a structure of opening up the worse than the worst, nowhere is that 
form more difficult (hence most necessary) to consider than in a film that 
teases us with the concreteness of various objects in close-up - a film that 
purports to make the image bear the burden of the disgusting but that, upon 
further examination, leaves open the gap for the possibilities of generating an 
ever worse as a formal structure.  David Lynch’s postmodern romp Wild at 
Heart (1990) is one of his films with the least critical favor (at worst: critics 
loathe it, it provokes intellectual disgust).  In one sense, the film requires, and 
provides, no plot summary - for it is largely a film of instants, memorable 
spectacles (the man in the bar who barks like a dog; Nicolas Cage’s Sailor 
Ripley singing Elvis songs), parodic quotations (largely of The Wizard of 
Oz), and signs of the Lynchean universe (it appears to be set in both the 
1980s and the 1950s, violence erupts under seemingly polite social 
circumstances, etc.).  At the same time, things do take place in the film - 
though, because it is a road movie, that taking place is always a displacement 
of sorts, a taking place in motion’s trajectory.  The film opens with Sailor 
fighting and killing a man who has been hired by the momma of his sweetie 
Lula Fortune (a writhing Laura Dern); violence is introduced asymmetrically 
as an effect always in excess of its cause.  Though parentally forbidden, Lula 
waits for Sailor to get out of prison, takes up with him again, and runs off to 
the anti-Oz, a sleepy Texas town where trouble and strangeness persistently 
follow them, as do the various men Lula’s mother has hired to kill Sailor and 
separate the lovers forever.   
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It is in Texas that Laura Dern vomits, and, as though conforming to 
Derrida’s insistence that one must think vomit, and not ‘the act or process of 
vomiting,’ the close-up of the vomit presents it distinctly a posteriori, in its 
material facticity as such, and well after it has come into being.5  The vomit 
arrives, as all good strangers must, from out of nowhere.  In the latter half of 
the film, Sailor and Lula bide their time in a motel room, fucking, loving, 
planning for futures that will inevitably be deferred.  Without warning - 
without seeing its coming into being - a scene opens with a close-up of vomit 
on the grimy motel floor, although it is also possible to fail to identify the 
contents of the strange patterned stain at all, on first seeing it.  The spot is 
large, wet, with indeterminate clumps, dark flies settling unevenly over the 
strange pale circle.  When Sailor soon thereafter returns to the motel room, 
he sits for a moment or two before asking, ‘What’s that smell?’, thus 
retroactively conferring an affective solidity to the anamorphotic spot.  Lula, 
lying on a bed, confesses that she ‘barfed’ and then there is, again, another 
brief shot of the vomit, this time from further away.  The visual relationship 
to the vomit in the film is comprised of just those two shots, together 
consuming mere seconds of screen time.  Later, Lula will realize - signaled by 
a flashback to an abortion when she was younger, a different type of 
extimate expulsion - that the vomit must mean she is pregnant; later still, 
when the villainous Bobby Peru (Willem Dafoe) attempts to seduce Lula, he 
will make reference to the smell of the vomit that lingers.  Vomit does not 
figure more prominently than this in Wild at Heart, and yet the film turns on 
it - the spill on the ground is the film’s grounding catastrophe. 
The parergonal vomit that arrives from without and yet centers and 
destabilizes the film’s world repeats the ejecting physicality of Laura Dern’s 
Lula, a shocking, vibrating twitch of a being.  Her contorted poses; pinup 
citations; distended, tortuous, wringing torsions make of her a walking 
(mostly dancing), talking (barely) affect on which a body is merely propped.  
A single arm, inexplicably lifted to the back of her head as a permanent pose, 
distorts her body into a Figure.  It could be said that there is no need to 
spend film time showing Lula vomiting, because her entire physicality in the 
film up to that point has been an ever-evicting self attempting to loosen the 
fragile bond between a body and an ‘I.’  (This fractured physicality is a 
structure that vomit constitutively puts into play; as Diderot words it in 
                                                
5 Nochimson’s reading of the other scene involving vomit, in which Lula’s mother 
hysterically retches, succumbs to the error of subjectifying vomit that Derrida 
decries; she writes, ‘the involuntary process of vomiting creates a tension between the 
direct sensory presence of the bodies of Lula and Marietta and their contrived styles 
of glamour’ (Nochimson 1997, 39).  Nochimson’s conflation of vomit with vomiting 
wrongly emphasizes issues of control (loss of, retention of, display of), epitomized in 
either the abandonment to involuntarism in vomiting or the abandonment to love 
figured in the film’s ending.  
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Élements de physiologie: ‘It is never you who wishes to eat or to vomit, it is 
the stomach; for urinating, it is the bladder’ ([1773-1774] 1975, 1:1308).)  
Dern’s arm slithers up through her hair to strain her body in angles and 
stretches; she is all squirms and wriggles.  It is as though the definitive mark 
of both the cinema of ultraviolence and the road movie - Bonnie and Clyde’s 
famous bullet-ridden ballet - had been elongated and spread out over the 
surface of Laura Dern’s writhing skin. Heaving, shrieking, shivering, panting, 
twisting, torquing - Lula, despite her clacking red shoes, is not Dorothy 
yearning for Oz, but the tornado itself. 
If violence is, on the one hand, a problem of vectors of energy radiating 
from the female body, it is also an interpersonal (and sexualized) structure 
epitomized by the rape of young Lula and Bobby Peru’s attempted rape-
seduction of older, pregnant Lula.  The earlier rape is introduced through a 
conversation in which Lula appears to offer her one and only lie to Sailor: 
she asserts that her mother did not know anything about her rape at twelve 
by an old family friend.  In a flashback, we see Marietta coming across a 
bloodied postcoital Lula and attacking the assailant.  If the rape introduces 
the possibility of deception - and lies in Lynch’s narratives are often 
associated with violence, as though violence’s first disruption is to the 
possibility of verifiable speech - it also introduces something unspeakable by 
Lula to Sailor and in Wild at Heart more generally.  The ontological status of 
the flashbacks, whether fantasized or historical, is indeterminate and 
indeterminable.  What vomit structurally designates in Wild at Heart as the 
possibility of a something worse than the worst is the retroactive violence of 
the rape, an unspeakable act that enters the film without having to be 
spoken, figured without losing its simultaneous quality of being, in a 
fundamental sense, unfigurable.   
The return to the rape is possible only because this non-place has been 
granted within the film’s logic; the citation of the rape of young Lula - a 
figural vomiting of it up into the present-day narrative - occurs in the 
infamous scene with Bobby Peru.  Willem Defoe’s foul villain knocks on 
Lula’s motel room door one day when Sailor is out working on their car.  He 
asks to use her bathroom and then pisses with the door open, his back to an 
increasingly agitated Lula.  Slinking out of the bathroom, Bobby Peru leers, 
‘You got the smell in this room of puke.  You been puking, little girl?  You 
sick?  Pregnant?’  In this scene, Defoe famously corners Dern, grabs her and 
says to her, over and over, ‘Say, “Fuck me.”’  Until she does, at which point 
he jumps back, grinning his gap-blackened maw, wildly yee-haws ‘Someday, 
honey, I will!’ and leaves a mortified Lula in his wake.  The humiliation of 
the forced speech is the force of assaultive exteriorization more broadly, 
figured as well in the unseen instance of vomiting.  But in place of the vision 
of that moment is this violence of speech wrenched out of the body, and the 
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violence of this force is made possible by a parasensual dimension of the 
vomit: not its vision, but its smell.  It is the smell of sick that lingers, 
permeates, mobilizes the violence of, and frames this scene (and this woman) 
- it is the condition for a non-visual apperception of the status of the 
(interior, fertile) body by Peru and the revelation of truth now available for 
blackmail.  Readings of this scene, Slavoj Žižek’s in particular (1997; 2001), 
reduce the dimension of exteriorization to a matter of the eroto-violent 
words spoken; but such a reading takes place under the logic of denial that 
Lula practices and that makes the violence against her possible: to critically 
refuse the lingering persistence of the smell of vomit that is the precondition 
for this very encounter. 
Smell, recall, is Kant’s account of the unsociable dimension of taste - it 
forces itself upon unwitting recruits to its sensory aspects.  It is smell by 
which Derrida accounts for ‘something more disgusting than the disgusting,’ 
and it is, crucially, not the sight of but the smell of the vomit that cannot be 
erased in Lula and Sailor’s hotel room - it is smell that introduces historicity 
and the archiving of time in the film.  It is the threatening mobility of scents 
that grounds this scene in a materiality that is of, but also beyond, bodies, 
and that makes, in fact, the forced utterance of ‘Fuck me’ only a citation of 
the more unmediated force of the smell of the vomit that already moves 
between, around, and among bodies.  This is not to psychologize the famous 
humiliation scene as a response to the olfactory trauma, but rather to suggest 
that vomit’s labor is neither thematic nor iconic but structural: that what 
vomit mobilizes for representation is the more disgusting than the literally 
disgusting dimension of smell.  For in the hierarchy of the cinematic senses, it 
is smell - and not blindness - that is vision’s true other.  The sensual 
prohibition at the heart of the cinematic medium - what is foreclosed 
absolutely from cinematic logics - is the lingering acidity that tears at the 
tissues of the nose.  The materiality of this film cannot be all; designated as 
centering Wild at Heart - framing it and framing Lula - is something that 
necessarily, absolutely and irreducibly, is excluded from its sensual 
workings.6  In other words, in Lynch’s film, terrible, unthinkable violence is 
smelled instead of spoken, smelled because it cannot be spoken. 
                                                
6 Attempts have been made to reincorporate that excluded element in both cinematic 
exhibitions (e.g., John Waters’ Odorama cards) and recent film theory.  See, for 
example, the argument in Marks (2000) that sense perceptions, mediated through 
memory, can be somatically reproduced in a body, and that, therefore, cinema can 
appeal directly to smell, taste, and touch.  A concern I have with this argument, 
however, is that Marks’s interest in emphasizing the role of embodied experiences of 
smell-, taste-, and touch-memories in processes of spectatorial understanding seems 
to reassert the hegemony of meaning and knowledge, merely reascribing which 
senses top the new hierarchy of terms erected by Western philosophy with Plato. 
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What vomit introduces in Wild at Heart is neither an appeal to an 
embodied spectator nor a trope nor a thematic subject or metaphorical 
expression; it puts into place, instead, the force of the olfactory as the formal 
agent that designates a structural rend at the center of the film, and that 
opens film form up to alterity.  Smell introduces as a non-inhabitable space 
the something more disgusting than the disgusting, the beyond that taste as 
the literally disgusting holds as security in place of that something worse.  
The horizon of the worse than the worst that the vomit in Wild at Heart 
opens is a designation that cannot be filled in by the earlier rape, shown in 
indeterminate flashbacks, nor by the humiliating, violating seduction shown 
in the present, but that is the condition that makes the unspeakability, the 
exteriority of both to the film’s narrative logic, possible in the first place.  In 
place of the close-up of the vomit figuring as the “this is this” model of 
disgust as overpresent, violently imposed on a spectator, Laura Dern’s vomit 
introduces something not given over to any perceiver but that forces the 
film’s narrative to nevertheless tarry with its unsociable sensual force.  In 
place of recuperating disgust for the visual by treating puke as something 
seen and not smelled, Lynch lets his vomit linger and reek; it orders bodies 
around, frames and hunts, reveals and accuses - it damns.  Wild at Heart is 
the nightmare of the transcendental aesthetic, in which ‘What is absolutely 
foreclosed is not vomit, but the possibility of a vicariousness of vomit’ 
(Derrida [1975] 1981, 25; emphasis added).  (Recall that vicarious means to 
be suffered by a substitute, an exchange of bodies, the sharability of horrors.)  
The film does not engage disgust in a metaphorical binary of the beautiful 
versus the ugly; rather, it commits to the overflow of vomit, its structural 
supplementarity, its position as the absolutely excluded.  Vomit, then, is not 
a proxy for the other unfigurable violences in the film; rather, the mobilizing 
of a foreclosed and lingering smell opens up a position for those violences to 
enter the film without entering the speakable cinematic narrative or the 
seeable cinematic image.  Violence becomes linked, not to events that happen 
to subjects, but to the film form itself, organized around a wandering, 
unsociable sense foreclosed within film’s optocentrism. 
The ethical promise in all this derives from Lynch’s commitment to 
letting his vomit smell.  Wild at Heart takes seriously the gesture of not 
cleaning up the vomit that has been left all over the floor; the lingering odors 
put in play an entire ethics of refusing to imagine one has transgressed with 
disgust - the fantasy that grounds A Hole in My Heart.  Instead, the wild 
persistence of sick’s smell extends in time as a form of the law by which 
further transgression is always and necessarily deferred - smells is what 
grounds the film in the certainty that the worst is not yet.  The alternative to 
not cleaning up the vomit is to imagine that one can swallow it without 
having to expel it (one fantasizes, that is, that one can secure an economy 
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with and of disgust).  Recall, the crucial insistence from Derrida: ‘There is 
worse than the literally disgusting.’  To give ground relative to one’s disgust, 
then, is to give up on the possibility of engaging with the truly unspeakable 
except in violating, through speaking, except in being unfaithful to the 
event’s very unspeakability.  A fidelity to the ethics of the worse than the 
worst takes seriously the impossibility of disgust remaining with the mouth; 
it refuses the lie that imagines that vomit produces an encounter with the 
limit.  Tarrying with a worse that is always yet to come - definitively not 
there where one can say it has arrived, and that will not be there when it has 
arrived because of its vicariousness - commits a text to the far less sure 
structure by which vomit opens up a deferred and uncertain limit.  But, in 
this great textual uncertainty - and it is great; it is rare; consider how many 
films clean up their vomit - in this abandonment through retaining a non-
occupied place of the ‘something more disgusting than the disgusting,’ is to 
be seen something very troubling to those who would insist that a camp or 
postmodern aesthetic has no room for an ethics.  For a practice - textual, or 
let us say, any - of not giving up on one’s Ekel designates the unassimilable 
without attempting to return it to the realm of the assimilable through what 
is always a form of violence.   
Do not imagine that this is a metaphor. 
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